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The Smoothing of Reported Corporate earnings through Target
Setting: Acceptable Practice or Shareholder Deception?

Abstract

The setting of earnings targets is frequently used by corporate managers to reduce
the volatility of reported earnings over successive periods. The practice exemplifies
the more informal or ad hoc category of income smoothing approaches. This paper
investigates the volatility reduction potential of target setting relative to the
underlying (but unobservable) income stream. The analysis uses a simulation
approach based on a statistical model of accounting measurement that treats periodic
earnings reports as successive samples drawn from the underlying earnings
generation process. The results indicate substantial reductions in earnings volatility
that are remarkably resilient to inaccuracies in targets and increase over reporting
periods. But accumulating errors due to misalignment between targets and the firm’s
expected sustainable earnings capacity may produce explosive volatility when
finally reported - to the detriment of shareholders and other long term stakeholders
relying on corporate reports.
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The Smoothing of Reported Corporate earnings through Target
Setting: Acceptable Practice or Shareholder Deception?

INTRODUCTION

The smoothing of a firm’s income across successive accounting periods is a
persistent and pervasive practice of corporate performance (Newman, 1998). Under
accrual accounting principles, some forms of earnings smoothing are acceptable,
even required, of managers. A common example is the systematic allocation of asset
costs to all relevant periods through the consistent application of time averaging
depreciation formulae (Lane and Willett, 1998).

But other, less systematic approaches to smoothing reported corporate earnings may
be less acceptable. This second category of income smoothing approaches is
characterized by informal or opportunistic adjustments to reported earnings over
successive periods rather than the systematic application of time averaging cost and
revenue allocation procedures. A prime example is the well-established practice of
earnings target setting (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; DeFond and Park, 1997).
Management pre-sets earnings targets over successive periods, adjusts actual earnings
to target and reports the target figures.

Among the managerial benefits of this practice is a potential reduction in the volatility
of reported income streams over successive periods in an effect known as ‘income
smoothing’. Earnings targets are set to dampen down the periodic fluctuations in the
underlying earnings stream of the firm as reported in the financial statements. Although
income smoothing across successive periods is only one consideration in setting
earnings targets, the practice is pervasive and persistent.

Little is known about the effect of target setting on the statistical properties of
accounting earnings. Willett (1991b) has shown that systematic, time averaging
methods of cost and revenue allocation across periods can produce significant
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reductions in the volatility of reported earnings streams. But there is no comparable
study of less formal approaches. The gap is significant given the current debate over
the rectitude of earnings management practices involved in several high profile
corporate collapses. A misalignment between the targets set by management and the
longer-term sustainable earnings capacity of the firm may bias performance
reporting to the detriment of the longer term interests of shareholders.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the adjustment of periodic
corporate earnings streams to pre-set target reduces the volatility of the reported
earnings streams relative to the unadjusted earnings streams. We investigate this
smoothing effectiveness both with and without final period corrections for any
volatility accumulation errors from previous periods. We then examine the influence of
three conditioning variables on our results – the number of periods in the time horizon,
the accuracy of management’s knowledge about the firm’s (unobservable) long run
expected earnings, and the presence of accrual based systematic smoothing in the
underlying earnings stream.

Our analytical method is based on the principles of statistical accounting measurement
known as Statistical Activity Cost Theory (SACT) due to Willett (1987) and Lane and
Willett (1998). This statistical estimation efficiency approach to accounting numbers
treats reported earnings figures as sample estimates of indirectly derived accounting
concepts such as long-run expected earnings (LREE) rather than as direct
measurements of economic concepts. Information content is a function of their
reliability as sample estimates of the LREE; where reliability refers to the degree of
dispersion (variance) of the sample earnings figures around the LRE. In this sense,
statistical estimation efficiency refers to the degree of volatility of successive
sample estimates (reported periodic earnings) around the target value - the long run
expected earnings per period (LREEP). The lower the dispersion of sample
estimates around the target value, the greater is the estimation efficiency.

In SACT terms, the aim of the paper is to investigate the effect of ad hoc target
setting on the estimation or inference efficiency of reported income figures where
these are treated as successive periodic samplings of the underlying corporate
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income/earnings stream rather than as direct measures of objective economic
constructs.

Our analysis is organized into five sections. Section two reviews the rationale for
using target setting as an income smoothing device and the potential for reporting
conflicts between short run volatility reduction behavior and excessive volatility
over longer time horizons. Section three explains the general principles of a
statistical measurement approach to accounting numbers and briefly reviews the
Statistical Activity Cost Theory (SACT) that we use to computer-generate the
simulation data in this analysis. Section four presents the simulation results on the
smoothing effectiveness of target adjusted earnings relative to both un-smoothed and
systematically smoothed benchmarks. The implications of the results for future
research agendas are discussed in section five.
S
Earnings Target Setting and Income Smoothing
Opportunistic smoothing through pre-set targets

DeFond and Park (1997) suggested that the management practice of using
discretionary accounting choices to smooth reported earnings around some predetermined target is accepted as ‘conventional wisdom’ in managerial performance
reporting. The strategic exercise of these accrual accounting choices is seen as a
legitimate, desirable management practice to promote reductions in income stream
volatility (Yeo, 2002; Magrath and Weld, 2002). Brugstahler and Dichev (1997)
provide supporting evidence of the extensive use of corporate target setting to
maintain consistent increases in earnings and to maintain positive earnings (see also
Weisbach, 1988; Warner et al, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Hayn, 1995).

But these more opportunistic methods of smoothing earnings numbers may be less
acceptable to corporate regulators, the accounting profession and auditors (Levitt,
1998; Elias, 2002). Beatty (2002) points out that the deceptive reporting practices in
many recent, high profile corporate collapses began merely as “ ’legitimate’ ”
corporate practices of smoothing reported earnings to meet pre-set earnings targets
rather than intentional deception of stakeholders. Magrath et al (2002) cite
staggering losses in corporate share value that were kept hidden from stakeholders
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by similar corporate earnings disclosure practices in the corporate bankruptcies of
Enron, Lucent Technologies, Cendant, Microstrategy and many other recent high
profile corporate collapses. Self interest, economic and industry cycles, poor
management and accumulating gaps between reported and actual earnings may
pressure management into deceptive earnings management practices to meet
expected earnings targets (Dutta, 2002; Jaggi, 2002).

Despite these failures, recent studies attest to the continued global persistence of
accruals management to meet pre-set earnings targets as a pervasive element in
corporate earnings management and reporting practice (Peasnell, Pope & Young,
2000b; Mathieu, 2003; see also Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993; Hayn, 1995;
Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Eddy and Taylor, 1999). Since corporate valuation is
determined by the present value of expected future sustainable earnings, target
setting is often defended as prudent and necessary both as a relative performance
exercise and for identifying the desirable level of reported earnings (Richardson and
Wu, 2002).

A common theme in many studies is the coincidence between earnings target setting
and the short-run nature of managerial self-interest. De Fond and Parker (1997)
suggest that the time frame of managerial self-interest rarely exceed two to three
reporting periods. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) also found that managerial selfinterest appears to emphasize reporting satisfactory results for the current and the
next period, rather than long-term performance reporting.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) also found that present earnings targets are
predominantly set on manager’s expectations of next period’s earnings. Manager’s
self-interest appears to emphasize reporting satisfactory results for the current and
the next period, rather than long-term performance reporting. Managers may set
targets for current year discretionary accruals at least partially in anticipation of
future earnings, but they tend only to consider immediate future expected earnings
when setting earnings or profit targets. However, Richardson and Waegelein (2002)
express a contrary view. They provide evidence that long-term corporate
performance considerations and plans can impact on earnings management
practices.

6

If managers emphasize short-term performance horizons, finance theory holds that
shareholders typically adopt a longer term view of company sustainable
performance. Current models of corporate valuation discount a firm’s expected
sustainable earnings over a much longer time horizons than manager’s self-interest
time frames - into perpetuity, or at least, the foreseeable future. In this context, the
value of successive periodic earnings reports to external stakeholders becomes a
function of the information they convey about the firm’s sustainable earnings and
dividend capacity over time as well as the income of discrete (but artificial)
accounting periods.

In this sense, the shorter-term nature of managerial self-interest may conflict with
shareholder’s interests, which span a much longer time horizon in relation to a
firm’s intrinsic, sustainable earnings capacity. If opportunistic target setting and
achievement practices merely hide reported earnings volatility by accumulating it
into later periods then the practice may deceive shareholders and other readers of
corporate reports about the sustainable level and behavior of the company’s earnings
capacity over time. We now investigate these propositions using a statistical
measurement theory approach to accounting numbers.

Does target setting produce effective income smoothing?
As early as 1969, Lev asserted that setting periodic earnings targets should enable
managers to effectively minimize the volatility of successive earnings estimates
(Lev, 1969). An earnings target is set for each period. Any residual difference in
actual performance is then adjusted to target levels through discretionary accrual
accounting choices. The procedure is repeated over successive periods. The only
structural limit to variance reduction is the capacity of managers to find sufficient
accrual choices to achieve the necessary earnings adjustments and their ability to set
targets that accurately reflects the long run parameter of interest.

Counter-balancing these gains are three sources of error that may, over time, exceed
the volatility of the unadjusted earnings figures - (i) differences between actual and
target earnings that accumulate over successive periods, (ii) differences between the
pre-set periodic targets and the adjusted earnings figures, and (iii) differences
between periodic targets and the long-run parameter of interest due to inaccurate
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forecasting of the LREEPP. The first item is the major source of error or correction.
The latter two factors represent sources of residual volatility in smoothed estimates
over the short run.

Where these actual-to-target earnings adjustments offset each other over successive
periods they are zero sum processes. But the ad hoc nature of setting successive
periodic earnings targets is more likely to result in non-zero sum processes where
the net adjustments accumulate over successive periods. In such cases, any
apparent reduction of volatility relative to unadjusted earnings may not be
eliminated, but just shifted into later periods where it keeps accumulating until
offset or corrected in a later period.

Managers may delay correction of the accumulating net adjustments for several
reporting periods. But, at some stage, they will have to reveal the true state of the
firm’s actual earnings record and reconcile it with the reported earnings situation.
From anecdotal evidence we suspect that delayed correction for the accumulating
unadjusted-to-target differences may create explosive volatility in the adjustment
period. The correction may then outweigh previous gains in estimation efficiency to the detriment of shareholders and other stakeholders with longer-term interests in
corporate performance.

METHOD
A Statistical Measurement Framework

Investigation of the earnings smoothing dynamics of target setting over time
requires an approach to accounting measurement that focuses on the statistical
properties of earnings numbers. In this study, we use Statistical Activity Cost
Theory (SACT) due to Willett, (1987, 1988) and Lane and Willett, (1993). SACT is
an axiomatic measurement approach to the consistent ranking of accounting
numbers on quantifiable criteria (Lane and Willett, 1993; Willett, 1987, 1988).

This statistical measurement approach was used by Willett (1987, 1988) to examine
the smoothing efficiency of time averaging cost procedures that are common in
accrual accounting. Hillier and McCrae (2000) also used the approach to generate
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data in a simulation study that compared the earnings smoothing efficiency of
alternative depreciation methods.
SACT treats reported earnings figures as indirect accounting measurements that
provide successive samples of the underlying earnings generation process where the
main interest is on the long run average value of that process (Willett, 1991b). These
sample estimates make up the transactional database of accounting numbers that
summaries the firm’s on-going transaction based activities. Each period’s reported
earnings figure represents a sample estimate of the firm’s long-run expected
earnings rather than a direct calculation of an economic construct. These sample
estimates are then used to make inferences about the accounting measures of
performance over time; for instance long term expected earnings, profitability or
cash surplus/deficit.

Under the statistical inference approach to accounting measurement, the information
content of accounting numbers relates directly to their statistical efficiency in
representing the long-run accounting measure of interest. In the present case, the
volatility of the periodic earnings figures can be used as a measure of their
efficiency as estimators of the long run expected or average earnings per period of
the firm. A decline in this sample variance will reduce uncertainty and increase
estimation efficiency. An increase in the volatility of these sample estimates will
produce the opposite effect (Brief and Owen, 1970; Gibbins and Willett, 1997; Hillier
and McCrae, 2000).

This statistical inference approach provides both a consistent axiomatic foundation
for accounting measurement and precise benchmarks for comparing the information
content of reported accounting numbers produced under alternative accounting
methods.

The desirability of systematic or unsystematic methods of earnings

smoothing is now ranked by their capacity to increase the statistical efficiency of the
sampling estimates. Smoothing practices that reduce the variance of the resulting
earnings samples increase their efficiency as sample estimators of long run expected
earnings per period. Volatility or variance provides a measure of estimation
uncertainty around the parameter of interest (Brief and Owen, 1970; Gibbins and
Willett, 1997). Under this approach, some types of earnings management may, in
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fact, improve the statistical properties of accounting numbers where these are taken
as sample estimates of the parameter of interest (Gibbins and Willett, 1997;
Gonedes, 1972).

Our analytical framework adopts the SACT approach of Lane and Willett (1993) as
formulated in Hillier and McCrae (1999). The SACT accounting earnings function
treats accounting numbers as arising from transactions that create activities over the
reporting period with characteristic starting, finishing and duration times, and
characteristic costs and revenues distributions. All these characteristics are stochastic
in the sense that, over time, they derive from random variable probability distributions
unique to that firm or industry both in terms of form of distribution and unique
moments (Willett 1987, 1989)

The earnings function is converted to a computer program allowing simulation
experiments over various functional forms and distributions of cost and revenue
determining variables. The basic transactional unit is the ‘activity’. Cost and revenue
observations for each activity are sampled from specified distributions for each
variable. The sampling distributions for number, starting times, durations, costs and
revenues of activities can be chosen to represent the unique firm or industry production
characteristics. These firm-specific characteristics determine the parameter values of
the earnings function that is used to generate sample estimates of earnings for a
nominated horizon of reporting periods. The periodic earnings contributions of
simulated activities are then accumulated on both an unadjusted earnings and a target
adjusted periodic earnings basis.

The simulations
A simulation program yielded sampling estimates per reporting period for targetadjusted earnings, unadjusted earnings and systematically smoothed earnings. Each
run contained 100 revenue/cost generating activities spread over the chosen time
horizon. Each trial consists of 1000 runs. So, each trial yields 100,000-point sample
estimates. Sample estimate variances are then calculated for the three earnings streams
as appropriate.
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A sample earnings variance reduction ratio (SEVRR) is then calculated for each of the
three variance types.

The SEVRR computes the ratio of the variances for target-

adjusted earnings (numerator) to unadjusted earnings variance or systematically
smoothed earnings respectively.

This ratio is used as a measure of the absolute

smoothing effectiveness of target adjusted earnings relative to unadjusted and
systematically smoothed earnings streams.

Conditioning factors.
We also examine the sensitivity of variance reduction results to three conditioning
factors. These are: (i) the number of period in time horizon, (ii) the variations in the
accuracy of target setting and (iii) the use of systematically smoothed earnings as a
benchmark in place of ‘unadjusted’ periodic earnings.

RESULTS
There are four sets of results for the simulation trials. Sets one and two compare the
variances of target-adjusted periodic earnings against the variance of the equivalent
unadjusted earnings as the benchmark for variance reduction. The first set of results
excludes any end-period adjustment for accumulated differences between actual
earnings and target earnings over the preceding (0-(T-1)) periods. The second set
includes the end period adjustments to offset any accumulated differences. Sets three
and four repeat the analysis using the variance of systematically smoothed earnings as
the benchmark for estimation efficiency. Set three again excludes any end-period
adjustment. Set four includes any adjustment. Set four includes adjustments of
accumulated errors.

The results also include two further conditioning factors that may influence the
degree of variance change: (i) the number of reporting periods and (ii) the degree of
accuracy of management’s knowledge about the firm’s long run expected earnings
potential.

The results are presented in seven tables. Tables two through five report the VRR
relative to unadjusted earnings and systematically adjusted earnings figures. The
variances reflect the spread or distribution of the reported earnings per period around
long run expected earnings. Tables six and seven show the differences in these ratios
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between two variance reduction benchmarks – unadjusted earnings and
systematically smoothed earnings variances.

Robustness of variance ratio results.
Before running the simulation trials we needed to test the uniformity of simulated
reduction results over separate trials. Significant differences between trials may create
problems for later testing. We ran 10 trials with 100,000 point sample estimates per
trial. Each trial has 1000 runs with 100 earnings generating activities per run spread
over the horizon. Each run is based on 100 revenue/cost generating activities. We then
compared the trials with the highest and lowest VRR values. Uniformity is measured
by (i) the absolute difference in VRR between the two trials and (ii) the absolute
difference standardized by the average variance reduction value over the ten trails.
Table one shows the results. On both measures, the differences in VRR values
between trials not significantly different from zero which eliminates differences
between trial results as a source of error in results.
Smoothing Effectiveness - Unadjusted Earnings Variance Benchmark
Set 1 - No End Period Correction
The first set of results omits any final period correction of accumulated adjustments
between actual earnings and target earnings over previous periods. Table two and
Figure two report the variance reduction between target-adjusted earnings and
unadjusted earnings per period excluding the end period adjustment for accumulated
(target-unadjusted) differences from previous {0 – (T-1)} periods. The body of
table two gives the VRR values for lengthening time horizons and decreasing
accuracy of each period’s target relative to the expected long-run earnings value. So,
for instance, over a two period horizon and 10 percent target inaccuracy each period,
the target-smoothed earnings per period variance is 18.25 percent of the unadjusted
earnings variance; 81.75 percent of the benchmark variance is removed by target
smoothing.
The results indicate that managers can give the appearance of large reductions in the
variance of corporate earnings streams by reporting target earnings rather than
unadjusted earnings per period, even where periodic earnings targets set by
management are relatively inaccurate estimators of long run earnings. Over a four
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period horizon, target-adjusted earnings remove over 60 per cent of the variance for
unadjusted earnings (Table 2).

The size of this variance reduction is relatively immune to reasonable levels of target
inaccuracy in terms of management’s ability to infer the firm’s sustainable earning
capability. Accurate target estimation of long run earnings by managers apparently
removes most of the earnings variance from a wide range of T period time horizons. A
target error of five percent relative to LRE still removes 95% of unadjusted earnings
variance over a two period horizon (Table 2). Even 20 per cent target inaccuracy still
results in a 74 per cent reduction in unadjusted earnings variance for a two period
horizon However, target levels in excess of 25% estimation error of LREEPP start to
exponentially erode estimating efficiencies (Table 2, Figure 2).

The number of periods in a time horizon also influences the size of variance reduction
at each level of target accuracy. Variance reductions increase as the time horizon
expands, although at a decreasing rate. Over two, four and 10 period horizons the
variance of target adjusted earnings decreases to under 18, 11 and 8 per cent of
unadjusted earnings variances respectively (Table 2, Figure 2).

These results suggest that managers can apparently smooth reported earnings
streams by reporting pre-set target levels in successive periods over fairly long time
horizons and target accuracies, relative to the parameter of estimation interest. But
these increases in statistical estimation efficiencies may be more apparent than real.

Set 2 - With End Period Correction
Where the actual-to-target adjustments accumulate over T periods, an earnings
correction must be reported in period T to offset the accumulated target adjustments
in the previous [0-(T-1)] periods. The second set of results includes this final period
correction. Table three reports the variance reduction ratio that includes an end
period correction for the accumulated differences between unadjusted and target
earnings levels. The reversal of results between tables 2 and 3 is dramatic. For a two
period horizon and 10 percent target inaccuracy the variance has now increased by
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153.18 percent relative to the benchmark variance as opposed to the 8 percent
decrease in Table 1.

These initial results confirm our suspicion that opportunistic smoothing may merely
shift accumulated errors between target and actual earnings into later periods rather
than eliminate it. This possibility now introduces a contrary influence. Time horizon
expansion may increase volatility reduction but it may also increases the size of the
terminal period correction per period when reconciling the targeted and earnings
estimates over the T period time horizon. The end period correction, when reported,
may exceed the estimation efficiencies of the previous [0-(T-1)] periods.

Table 3 shows that inclusion of end period error corrections creates estimation
variance inefficiencies over all time horizons and all degrees of target accuracy relative to the variance of the unadjusted sample earnings estimates. The inclusion
of end period corrections causes reversals of volatility reduction into excess
volatility. Even when targets accurately reflect LRE, target volatility still exceeds
unadjusted earnings variance.

Lengthening the time horizon
This excess volatility grows dramatically over the number of periods in a time horizon.
Even with small target errors, the 13.8 per cent increase in estimation variance for two
periods rises to 22.6 per cent over four periods (Tables 3). More periods imply both
additional (target-actual) adjustments to offset, and the increasing likelihood that
targets will deviate from the evolving LREEPP; thus introducing another source of
error. So the horizon end correction becomes progressively larger due to increasing
target error and accumulated adjustments error (unadjusted to target) over time. As
mentioned, over a two-period horizon, excess volatility is 13% over actual earnings.
But at ten periods, the volatility has increased by 1.621 times the volatility of the
unadjusted earnings.

The increased volatility is actually spread over all periods. But target setting delays the
effects and cumulates them into the last period of the time horizon. For instance, Table
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3 shows that over a 5 period horizon, the reported target incomes in the first four
periods will give financial statement readers the impression of stable earnings around a
persistent longer term earnings potential. But this is more than offset in period 5 by the
sudden dramatic adjustment to income as managers offset the cumulative adjustments
and target error in previous periods. The longer this apparently stable target based
income stream is reported the worse will be the accumulated but delayed adjustment in
the last period of the time horizon (Table 3).

Increased Target Error
The excess volatility may be intensified by the likelihood of target estimation errors
due to a manager’s lack of knowledge about future cost and revenue parameter
values, future activity levels and expectations about LREEPP values. Managers’
targets are likely to over- or under- shooting LREEPP; especially where short-term
considerations are their main focus. When final period corrections are included
(scenario 2), the excess volatility is extremely sensitive to the degree of target error
relative to the long run parameter. As error increases so does the resultant excess
volatility. Table three shows that a target inaccuracy of five percent over a six period
horizon results increases benchmark variance by 154.28 percent. At 20 percent
target inaccuracy this inefficiency is 4.2553 times the unadjusted earnings variance.

A conjunction of increasing target error and time horizon periods compounds both
effects (Table3 and Figure 3) and leads to a significant increase in relative variance
ratios at larger numbers of periods. A target error of 20% per period over 6 periods
increases the REVR to 4.26 times the actual earnings variance. Over10 periods, the
same REVR value increased to 4.34 time’s actual earnings variance

Over these multi-period time horizons, financial statement readers would observe a
smoothed reported income with less volatility than the actual (but unobservable)
earnings figures over 5 and 9 periods respectively. But these reported targets are
deceptive as an estimate of LREE. They hide the cumulative error introduced by
target error and adjustment error. The sixth and tenth periods respectively would see
a dramatic adjustment in reported earnings as managers offset these cumulative
target errors.
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Of course, managers may minimize offset effects by backing it out gradually over
time. During down turns and recessions, the market expects poor results and is less
likely to be surprised or condemn poor performance. These negative expectations
give managers the opportunity to periodically compensate for prior upward earnings
adjustments without hurting their own self-interest too much.

Sets 3 and 4 - Systematic Smoothing Bench-mark
Corporate earnings streams contain a degree of systematic, time averaging in
cost and revenue streams; that is, the systematic allocation of costs and revenues to
successive periods according to a deterministic model. Accrual accounting principles
mandate these systematic smoothing methods for the calculation of periodic earnings
estimates Willett, (1991) and Hillier and McCrae, (1999) show that cost and revenue
allocations through such time averaging techniques as depreciation, amortization, debt
and goodwill provisions increase estimation efficiency of unadjusted earnings streams
over a wide range of conditions, including time horizons, allocation methods and
managers’ knowledge states. So comparing ad hoc smoothing techniques against a
systematically smoothed earnings benchmark is arguably more appropriate than an
unadjusted earnings volatility benchmark.

Establishing the relative estimating efficiencies of the two alternative methods is also a
worthwhile exercise from the perspectives of managers, shareholders, regulators and
other stakeholders. The comparison permits a relative ranking of measurement
efficiency of two systems on unambiguous, consistent and quantifiable measurement
criteria.

Set 3 - No End Period Correction
The results in this set compare the variance of target-adjusted earnings with that of
systematically smoothed earnings streams excluding any end period correction. The
results are reported in Table 4 and Figure 4. The body of Table four is the same as for
Table two, except that the benchmark is now the variance of systematically smoothed
earnings.

The comparative results are remarkably similar as shown in Table five which shows
the difference in variance reduction between the two benchmarks. Table five combines
16

Tables two and four. Tables five (and Table seven) compare that variance of targetadjusted earnings against an unadjusted earnings variance benchmark, with the same
ratio against the systematically smoothed earnings variance benchmark. Negative cell
numbers indicate that variance reductions (increases) of target-adjusted earnings
against the unadjusted earnings variance benchmark variance are greater (smaller)
than for the systematically smoothed earnings variance benchmark.

Positive cell

numbers indicate the reverse situation.

The results indicate that the estimation efficiency improvements against systematically
smoothed volatility benchmarks are only 1 to 3 per cent less than for the non-smoothed
benchmarks (Table 5). The comparison suggests that the sample earnings estimation
efficiency gains from targeting are not greatly affected by the choice of benchmark
earnings streams. A not unreasonable result since the maximum potential efficiency
gains is a reduction of earnings variance to zero in the case of absolute target accuracy
or to extremely low levels of variance about the long run expected earnings at
reasonable levels of target accuracy (up to 10% difference). In these cases, the starting
benchmark variance is somewhat immaterial.

Set 4 - With End Period Correction
Set four results include end period corrections for any accumulated variance in
previous periods. The variance reduction ratio values between target adjusted and
systematically smoothed earnings are given in Table 6.

The body of table six shows the ratio values over lengthening time horizons and
varying target accuracy levels.

Figure six gives a visual representation of the

results. The general pattern of results is similar to the unadjusted earnings
benchmark case. The inclusion of the end period correction now creates statistically
significant excess volatility (at the 5 percent confidence interval) rather than
volatility reduction. The volatility increase is observed at all levels of target
accuracy and across all time horizons. The strength and similarity of this outcome
over the two volatility benchmarks implies that adjustment to target does not reduce
the inherent volatility relative to unadjusted earnings estimates. The differences just
accumulate over successive periods until correction in some ‘final’ period of the
horizon (Tables 6).
17

But the pattern is intensified for the systematically smoothed benchmark case.
Increases in excess volatility over identical horizons and target accuracy are
significantly greater than for the unadjusted earnings benchmark. Table 7 compares
the variance reductions under the two benchmarks (Table three with Table six).
Negative cell numbers again indicate that variance increases for of target-adjusted
against smoothed earnings are greater than for the unadjusted earnings variance
benchmark. Positive cell numbers indicate the reverse situation.
The differences are highly significant at the 5 per cent confidence interval. Even a
two period time horizon with relatively accurate targets (110% of LREEPP) gives a
20% absolute difference in SEVRR.

Excess volatility the smoothed earnings case (scenario 4) increases more than
monotonically with expanding time horizons and increased inaccuracy of targets
relative to LREEPP. At less accurate target levels (160% to 180% of LREEPP) and
longer time horizons (8 to 10 periods) the differences become increasingly larger.
For these longer horizons, the excess volatility against the systematically smoothed
earnings benchmark from 24 percent to 80 percent larger than the excess volatility
against the unadjusted earnings benchmark (Table 7).

Results Summary
To summarise, when reported periodic earnings are treated as sample estimates of
long run expected earnings per period, managers can apparently use earnings targets
to reduce the volatility of unadjusted earnings estimates. This variance reduction can
be both dramatic and fairly robust to target error of up to 10-5 percent. The
reduction increases with additional reporting periods. However, the volatility
reduction may be more apparent than real since it assumes either (i) that successive
target adjustments are offsetting or (ii) that managers can hide the implied correction
needed to offset accumulating differences over successive periods. When managers
are forced to disclose an end period correction, the smoothing results are
dramatically reversed. Earnings estimates are now more volatile. This excess
volatility is sensitive both to target error and to lengthening time horizons.
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A broadly similar pattern emerges when the benchmark for volatility reduction is
changed to the variance of systematically smoothed earnings. As long as the end
period correction is excluded, the volatilities of reported earnings estimates appear
to reduce substantially. The reductions have low sensitivity to target error, up to 1015 percent of LREEP. Volatility reduction increases with time. The inclusion of end
period corrections for accumulated (target-actual earnings) errors also results in
excess volatility.

But here the similarities end. The comparison between the two benchmarks in Table
seven illustrates the dramatic change. Excess volatilities are significantly larger than
for the unadjusted earnings benchmark at all time horizons and target inaccuracy
levels. They are also are more sensitive to target error size and time horizon length.
The result is significant since, under accrual accounting principles, systematically
smoothed earnings and profit streams are required procedures in corporate financial
performance estimation and reporting. Earnings estimation on accrual accounting
principles appears particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of ad hoc or
opportunistic methods of smoothing income streams.

These results raise concern for corporate, accounting and audit regulators and for
stakeholders since accrual accounting is the mandatory form of corporate
accounting. Accrual accounting streams are dominated by time averaging of costs
and revenues. Yet such systematically smoothed income streams appear to be more
susceptible to excess volatility shocks than cash-based accounting performance
indicators.

DISCUSSION
Our approach to the measurement accuracy of periodic reported earnings figures differs
from the traditional ‘valuation’ based measurement approach adopted by accounting
standard setters and regulators. Under SACT, periodic accounting performance
numbers are not seen as direct, representations of the underlying production processes
of the firm, but rather as sample estimates of a firm’s economic transactions over
successive accounting periods based on indirect or derived accounting concepts that
only indirectly represent the results of those transactions. Each reported figure is a
sample estimate of the parameter of interest over the reporting horizon – for instance,
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sustainable earnings. Alternative methods of opportunistic or ‘ad hoc’ income
smoothing through alternative accrual accounting choices are then ranked by their
ability to reduce sample estimation variance in representing the earnings parameter of
interest.

The results show that managers can substantially lower the variances of successive
reported earnings figures (relative to unadjusted figures) if they set earnings targets,
adjust actual earnings to these targets and ignore any accumulating errors. This
variance reduction increases with the number of periods. The results are even fairly
robust against inaccuracies in managers’ target setting accuracy relative to the long
run parameter of interest – up to 15 per cent inaccuracy.

However, if managers continually set targets that differ substantially from the
expected sustainable earnings (e.g. over 20 per cent error), then the estimation
variance quickly exceeds the variance of unadjusted estimates in a non-linear
fashion. This excess is magnified when LRE follows a growth (decline) rather than a
constant path over successive reporting periods. Such large or persistent levels of
target inaccuracy may motivate managers to redress the imbalance, since at
significant levels of error, the speed of volatility increase relates to error size. Errors
can quickly accumulate out of control.

In a recent study, Ioannidis, Peel and Reel (2003) also propose the potential nonlinearity of corporate target ratio adjustment to error size. Drawing on the time
series properties of financial ratios work by Tippett (1990), Tippett and Whittington
(1995) and Whittington and Tippett, (1999), they suggest that the rate of adjustment
of ratios to their optimal value is an increasing function of deviation from target.
Within a range of small error, managers may refrain from target adjustment, but
outside a certain error range they may become increasingly concerned with the size
of potential error adjustments and take more dramatic and speedier remedial action
as discrepancies grow larger (p. 701).

The inclusion of a terminal period correction for any accumulated errors creates a
different situation. Estimation efficiency relative to unadjusted earnings is reduced
over all time horizons (even just 2 periods), all expectation states about LREEPP and
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all target error levels. This inefficiency gets worse as more periods are added, as
managers’ forecasts of expected LREEPP become less accurate and as target setting
errors increase relative to the expected LREEPP.
Our results have direct implications for future regulation of accounting earnings
reporting. They show that such ad hoc practices as setting periodic earnings targets and
then using accounting choices to artificially attain those targets can give the illusion of
stable income streams by shifting the earnings volatility into subsequent reporting
periods. The real underlying volatility is kept hidden by simply delaying the correction
of the accumulating target to actual earnings errors until some regulatory or
circumstantial factor forces disclosure. At this point, shareholders and other external
stakeholders suddenly discover the accumulated earnings volatility from previous
periods.

Several national corporate and accounting regulators emphasise the need for greater
vigilance against the accounting standards manipulation as the most effective tool
against future abusive earnings management and fraudulent accounting practices
(Jenkins, 2002; SEC, 2003; Magrath and Weld, 2002). But as Vinciguerra, &
O'Reilly-Allen (2004) emphasise, the difficulty is the separation of earnings
management practices that fall within accepted corporate practice from those that
are considered contrary to the intention of accounting and corporate reporting
regulation.
Not all earnings management practices are necessarily fraudulent. Discretionary
choice under accrual accounting principles creates a spectrum of alternative
corporate accounting strategies – from conservative accounting through positive and
‘creative’ accounting, onto misleading accounting, deliberately deceptive accounting
and finally fraudulent accounting practices. Conservative strategies include
systematic ‘time averaging’ forms of cost and revenue allocation. The opportunistic
type of discretionary adjustments to periodic reported earnings may be less
acceptable. Even discretionary adjustment of corporate periodic earnings to meet
pre-set earnings targets through accrual (or other) choices, may, over time, lead to
deceptive corporate reporting.

We have limited discussion of opportunistic or ‘add hoc’ earnings smoothing
techniques to pre-setting targets because of its wide acceptance as an established part of
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earnings management and ‘good’ corporate governance. Our concern is with the effect
of income smoothing techniques on the statistical properties of reported earnings
numbers. But the results are so decisive as to suggest that corporate regulators,
accounting standard setters and those charged with overseeing good corporate
governance need to consider the implications of a statistical estimation approach to
accounting numbers for detection of deceptive reporting practices in relation to
performance indicators. For instance, knowing that income smoothing is a widely used
corporate reporting practice is one thing, being able to tell when such manipulation of
periodic results has occurred is quite another. There is still relative little work on the
statistical properties of accounting earnings time series that might assist in identifying
such situations.
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Table 1
Variance ratio trial accuracy: Target adjusted/unadjusted Earnings
variance differences for two extreme values in a ten trial series

(with end period correction}
Extreme
Trials
4
8
Average

Periods
2 Pds
Var
1.1
1.176

0.076

4Pds
Var VarDiff
1.238
1.215
0.023

6Pds
Var VarDiff
1.432
1.407
0.025

8Pds
Var VarDiff
1.492
1.438
0.055

0.066*

0.019*

0.017*

0.037*

VarDiff

10Pds
Var VarDiff.
1.604
1.639
0.034
0.0212*

* represent average difference over ten trials
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Table 2
Variance Reduction Ratios: Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Earnings
Increasing time horizons, Decreasing target accuracy for LREEP
(without end period correction)
Periods
in Horizon
2
4
6
8
10

100%
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

105%
0.0492
0.0376
0.0291
0.0227
0.0178

Target Accuracy in Estimating LREEP
110%
115%
120%
0.1825
0.4608
0.7313
0.1428
0.3381
0.5919
0.1127
0.2569
0.453
0.0863
0.2021
0.3509
0.0738
0.1685
0.2969

140%
3.0781
2.4072
1.8277
1.4289
1.2004

160%
7.2705
5.3816
4.115
3.1988
2.6877

Figure 2
Variance Reduction Ratios: Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Earnings
Increasing time horizons, Decreasing target accuracy for LREEP
(without end period correction)

Variance ratio
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Table 3
Variance Reduction Ratio: Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Earnings
Increasing time horizons, Decreasing target accuracy for LREEP
(with end period correction)
% LREPP

Periods
in Horizon
2
4
6
8
10

100%
1.0966
1.3099
1.4054
1.5629
1.6704

105%
1.1603
1.4172
1.5428
1.6424
1.9322

110%
1.5318
1.7737
2.0027
2.0741
2.3435

115%
2.1056
2.7183
2.9088
3.1043
3.3628

120%
2.5059
3.5999
4.2553
4.1009
4.342

140%
7.443
10.818
12.2354
12.9996
13.8242

Figure 3
Variance Reduction Ratios: Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Earnings
Increasing time horizons, Decreasing target accuracy for LREEP
(with end period correction)

Variance ratio

5
4
120%

3

115%
110%

2
1
0

105%
2

4

6

8

10

100%

Target
Accuracy

Periods

29

160%
15.4091
22.5547
26.2543
27.1467
28.7542

Periods
In Horizon
2
4
6
8
10

Table 4
Variance Reduction Ratio:Target Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings
RVP Expectation State
Increasing periods, decreasing target accuracy for LREEP
(without end period correction)
%LREPP
1.0000
1.05%
1.10%
1.15%
120%
0.0000
0.0527
0.1947
0.4634
0.7771
0.0000
0.0472
0.1831
0.4292
0.7493
0.0000
0.0419
0.1687
0.3766
0.6682
0.0000
0.036
0.1377
0.3249
0.5542
0.0000
0.0309
0.1335
0.3055
0.5522

140%
3.3455
2.9428
2.7627
2.2742
2.2585

160%
8.0054
7.0521
6.1062
5.22
4.7592

Figure 4
Variance Reduction Ratio:Target Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings
RVP Expectation State
Increasing periods, decreasing accuracy
(without end period correction)

Variance
Ratio

0.8000
0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
120%
115

0.3000
0.2000

110
105%
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0.0000
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2
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6
Periods

8

10

T arget Accuracy
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Table 5
Difference in Variance Reduction Ratios for two Benchmarks - Unadjusted & Smoothed Earnings
(Table 2 v. Table 4)
Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Ratios versus Target-Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings Ratios
(without end period correction)
%LREEPP
1.00%
1.10%
120%
140%
160%
Average Difference Average Difference Average Difference Average Difference Average Difference
-0.0035
-0.0122
-0.0458
-0.2674
-0.7349
-0.0096
-0.0403
-0.1574
-0.5356
-1.6705
-0.0128
-0.056
-0.2152
-0.935
-1.9912
-0.0133
-0.0514
-0.2033
-0.8453
-2.0212
-0.0131
-0.0597
-0.2553
-1.0581
-2.0715
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Table 6

Variance Reduction Ratio: Target Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings
Increasing Periods, Decreasing target Accuracy for LREEP
(with end period correction)
Periods
in Horizon
2
4
6
8
10

100%
1.2218
2.0635
2.692
3.4248
4.1286

105%
1.45961
2.1864
2.7342
3.8112
4.5753

% LREEPP
110%
115%
1.7335
2.3532
2.6768
3.5861
3.5579
4.8001
4.3289
6.1528
5.3157
7.2462

120%
2.7583
4.9836
6.9906
7.6123
9.5029

140%
8.136
13.6009
18.7432
21.65
27.6624

160%
17.0249
29.6903
39.4236
45.4348
51.9673

Figure 6
Variance Reduction Ratio: Target Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings
Increasing periods, Decreasing target Accuracy for LREEP
(with end period correction)

variance ratio
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8
6

120%
115%
110%%

4
2
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10
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Table 7
Difference in Variance Reduction Ratios for two Benchmarks - Unadjusted & Smoothed Earnings
(Table 3 v. Table 6)
Target Adjusted/Unadjusted Ratios versus Target-Adjusted/Smoothed Earnings Ratios
(with end period correction)
%LREEPP
Periods
1.00%
1.10%
120%
140%
160%
Average
Average Difference Average Difference Average Difference Average Difference
Difference
-0.1252
-0.2
-0.25
-0.693
-1.6158
2
-0.7536
-0.9
-1.38
-2.783
-7.1356
4
-1.2866
-1.56
-2.74
-6.508
-13.1693
6
-1.8619
-2.25
-3.51
-8.65
-18.2881
8
10

-2.4582

-2.97

-5.16

-13.84

-23.2131
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